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Conflict at the Naval Postgraduate School in Monterey, California. The views expressed here are 
those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent the views of NPS, the Department of 
Defense, or the U.S. Government. 
Introduction 
This paper will assess the extent to which transnational terrorists, in particular global Jihadists 
associated with Osama bin Laden, have been interested in attacks against the global energy 
infrastructure.[1] We then assess the extent to which terrorists have in fact targeted that 
infrastructure and with what effect. We then place these attacks in the context of other supply 
disruption events. Finally, we make suggestions about a viable way ahead. 
Western fears about the threat posed by transnational terrorists to energy supplies certainly seem 
warranted. al-Qaeda has repeatedly threatened to disrupt supplies and have followed up on those 
threats in a few cases. For example, following the attack on the French tanker Limburg in October 
2002, al-Qaeda issued a statement that it "was not an incidental strike at a passing tanker 
but...on the international oil-carrying line in the full sense of the word."[2] 
Moreover, al-Qaeda sees the U.S. intervention in Iraq as strongly linked to the supply of oil. A Bin 
Laden audio tape broadcasted December 19, 2004 proclaimed: 
Targeting America in Iraq in terms of economy and losses in life is a golden and unique 
opportunity. .. One of the most important reasons that led our enemies to control our land is the 
theft of our oil....Be active and prevent them from reaching the oil, and mount your operations 
accordingly, particularly in Iraq and the Gulf, for this is their fate.[3] 
Several Jihadi theorists and commentaries on their ideas have also highlighted the importance of 
striking oil targets. For example, a Jordanian journalist, Fouad Hussein, claims that energy 
attacks play a major role al-Qaeda strategy based on his interviews with their leadership. He sees 
them pursuing a multistage approach to eventual establishment of an Islamic caliphate by 2020. 
The first stage leads to the awakening of Muslim masses through such actions as the attack on 
the World Trade Center in 2001. In the second phase, from 2003-2007, called the "Eye Opening," 
al-Qaeda "deprives the West of energy [and] denies 'proxy regimes' oil revenue." 
In the third phase al-Qaeda recruits enough individuals to be able to confront Israel directly so 
that in the fourth phase from 2010 to 2013, "Economic warfare will be waged against the United 
States and the West more broadly—including burning "Arab oil" and conducting electronic attacks 
against critical infrastructures." By 2020, al-Qaeda achieves victory. 
Other al-Qaeda strategists argue attacks against oil and gas infrastructure are attractive not so 
much because of their intrinsic value but because of the cost of defending them.[4] Osama bin 
Laden himself has advocated this bleed to bankruptcy policy and cited it as one of the reasons for 
the success against the Soviets in Afghanistan. 
Many experts take these warnings to heart and proclaim the vulnerability of global energy supply. 
For example, Robert Baer, writing about the concentration of assets in the Saudi Arabia in his 
book titled "Sleeping with the Devil: How Washington Sold Our Soul for Saudi Crude" claimed: "a 
moderate-to-severe attack on Abqaiq would slow average production there from 6.8 million 
barrels a day to roughly a million barrels for the first two months post-attack." 
Terrorists Targeting 
The RAND Corporation posits four types of hypotheses regarding al-Qaeda.[5] The first is a 
coercion hypothesis which posits that al-Qaeda will attempt to coerce the United States to leave 
the Muslim world. The second is the damage hypothesis where al-Qaeda tries to limit the U.S. 
ability to intervene in the Muslim world. The third is the rally hypothesis whereby al-Qaeda seeks 
to recruit like-minded individuals to resist U.S. efforts. And fourth is the franchise thesis whereby 
al-Qaeda, lacking resources, serves as a clearing house for other loosely affiliated organizations. 
For our purposes we are most concerned with the damage hypothesis which covers economic 
targets generally. 
RAND looked at 14 targets from the 1993 attack on the World Trade Center to the 2004 bombing 
of the Hilton Taba Resort in South Sinai, Egypt. Many of these targets fit several of the 
hypotheses. For example, 9/11 fits the coercion, damage and rally hypotheses. Many targets met 
several objectives. Nevertheless, al-Qaeda has shown a decided preference for coercion in 13 
out of the 14 cases. Much less support appears for the franchise (7 of 14) and rally hypotheses (5 
of 14). Least support comes for the damage hypothesis (4 of 14) and only one of these is an 
energy target, the attack on the French tanker Limburg in 2002. Interestingly some analysis 
suggests that the terrorists attacked the Limburg only because their preferred target, a U.S. 
military vessel, did not present itself.[6] 
Examining all the international terrorist incidents between 1999 and 2006 reveals very little 
interest in energy targets, as can be seen in Figure One. Of the almost 2000 international terrorist 
incidents only 23 or about 1 percent involved utilities, the surrogate in the Memorial Institute for 
the Prevention of Terrorism data base for energy targets.[7] Many of these international incidents 
are little different from domestic targets except they involve foreigners instead of locals. Nothing 
comparable to the Limburg incident exists in the MIPT data base. 
Terrorist incidents overall have increased dramatically since 1999 (see Figure Two). From 1999 
to 2001, terrorist incidents overall remained at 1000. After 2001 they steadily increased reaching 
6500 incidents by 2006. International incidents, those involving foreigners, did not increase at the 
same rate or follow the same pattern. For 1999 and 2000, incidents were around 100, jumping to 
200 in 2001 and 300 in 2002. The number receded a bit in 2003 to 277 but jumped to 395 in 2004 
and fell off to 311 and 241 in 2005 and 2006 respectively. Many of these incidents are "drive-
bys," foreigners who were caught up in an ongoing insurgency. Very few are spectacular 
incidents such as those cited by the RAND study. 
According to MIPT, the global al-Qaeda organization has conducted 25 attacks since 9/11, none 
of them similar to the Limburg. Other attacks on oil infrastructure include a failed attempt on an 
Iraqi oil terminal in 2004 and a failed suicide bombing of the Abqaiq facility in Saudi Arabia on 24 
February 2006. The terrorists were unable to penetrate the compound. The Saudis also arrested 
individuals in 2006 and 2007 that purportedly were planning attacks against oil facilities.[8] 
The dramatic increase in the number of terrorist incidents reflects the increasing use of terrorism 
in ongoing insurgencies particularly in places like Iraq and Afghanistan. Figure Three shows that 
the insurgency in Iraq accounts for an increasing percentage of terrorist incidents, accounting for 
roughly 60 percent of total incidents in 2006. 
Attacks on energy infrastructure follow the same pattern as the overall increase in terrorist 
incidents as can be seen in Figure Four. From 1999 to 2001, attacks on infrastructure remained 
below 50, doubled to 100 in 2002 and fell back to below 50 in 2002. Since then attacks have 
steadily increased, almost doubling each year. 
A detailed examination of the infrastructure attacks is given in Figure Five. The distribution of 
attacks suggests that insurgents can have differing objectives in their attacks on energy 
infrastructure. al-Qaeda in Iraq is widely considered to be particularly violent with little concern for 
killing civilians. They believe in intimidation through violence. Thus over half of attacks in Iraq are 
against employees. Moreover, terrorists in Iraq like to target tanker trucks, the explosion of which 
can produce substantial damage. A favored target for insurgents everywhere are pipelines which 
run above ground. Transmission lines and their pylons are also attractive. Baluchi insurgents in 
Pakistan are particularly fond of attacking the Loti gas plant in Dera Bugti in part because they 
resent what they see as the exploitation of their resources without compensation.[9] "It is a great 
injustice," said a goat herder from Dera Bugti, Foj Ali. "They are making billions of rupees 
pumping gas from our land to the rest of the country, and we are still using firewood."[10] 
In a recent report, the Government Accounting Office lists several reputed "recent high-profile 
terrorism incidents against tankers and energy infrastructure."[11] This list includes the attacks 
mentioned already, but adds the assault on the Shell oil facility in Nigeria in June 2006, the 
hijacking of the Penrider in 2003 and a pirate attack on the chemical tanker Dewi Madrim in 2003, 
the last of which is arguably not a terrorist incident at all. Only six incidents made this list and 
none of them had significant consequences. Small wonder that the Limburg case remains the one 
most commonly cited as an example of al-Qaeda intentions. 
Piracy continues to be a problem, but it is economically not politically motivated. After the 
incidents in 2003-4, littoral states to the Malacca Strait stepped up their patrols. Incidents dropped 
from 28 in 2003 and 38 in 2004 to 12 in 2005, 11 in 2006 and 7 in 2007.[12] Overall, there were 
445 incidents of piracy in 2003, 329 in 2004, 276 in 2005, 239 in 2006 and 263 in 2007. 
Particularly noteworthy is the spike of 42 incidents in Nigeria in 2007. The vast majority of 
successful attacks, 127 out of 187, have occurred with the ship was berthed or anchored. The 
vast majority of unsuccessful attacks, 58 out of 76, occurred when the ship was steaming. Pirate 
attacks on tankers are actually quite common. In 2007, 52 chemical tankers were attacked, 25 
crude oil tankers, 5 LPG tankers, 1 Bitumen tanker and 1 LNG tanker. Clearly pirates are 
interested in tankers even if terrorists seem not to be. For example, on 22 September 2007, 
pirates boarded and hijacked the Indonesian Product Tanker MT Kraton which carried a cargo of 
Palm Olein. Two days later the Indonesian located the tanker, boarded it and detained the 14 
pirates. Also noteworthy is that in many of the incidents in Nigeria, the local coast guard and 
police failed to respond to calls for help. 
In sum, spectacular attacks against the global energy infrastructure are rare and the only 
successful such attack occurred in 2000. On the other hand, attacks against the energy 
infrastructure have become routine in at least three ongoing insurgencies, Colombia, Iraq and 
Pakistan. Most of these attacks had only a minor effect. How do these attacks and attendant 
disruptions compare with other events affecting supply? 
Significant Events Affecting Oil Supply  
The Energy Information Agency tracks the significant events affecting global supply of oil and gas; 
from 1970 to 2006[13] only three events related to terrorism or ethnic conflict were considered 
large enough in their effect to be listed: 62, the attacks on the Word Trade Center and the 
Pentagon on 9/1//2001; 70, continuing oil supply disruptions in Iraq and Nigeria in 2005; and 73, 
militant attacks in Nigeria which decreased production by as much as 600,000 barrels per day 
(bpd). The attack on the French tanker Limburg was not viewed as being significant enough to 
affect prices. Moreover, 9/11 actually led to a decline in prices as global markets feared an 
economic slowdown in the United States. The February 2006 violence in Nigeria was followed by 
a short spike in the price of oil which then fell back sharply to $50. It is estimated that 15 percent 
of Nigeria's production capacity of 3.1 million bpd remains unavailable because of the ongoing 
violence.[14] 
One reason that the Nigerian violence did not have a more lasting effect may have been that 
there was sufficient spare capacity in oil at that time and production could be increased to meet 
the shortfall. Currently, OPEC alone, or perhaps more precisely Saudi Arabia, has sufficient 
capacity to handle some shortfalls. However spare capacity is a real issue. It had fallen to 1.25 
million bpd in 2007 but is scheduled to increase to 3.1 million bpd during 2008.[15] 
Natural events rather than terrorism have had a much more pronounced effect on the oil market. 
Tropical Storm Cindy and Hurricanes Dennis, Katrina, and Rita so disrupted the market that the 
United States sold 11 million barrels of oil from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve and lent almost 
10 million. Hurricanes Rita and Katrina shut down about 1.3 million barrels of refining capacity, 
about 8 percent of the U.S. national total.[16] Much of the shortfall was met by imports. 
Political events not associated with terrorist attacks also effect supply. For example, a general 
strike in Venezuela in 2002 led to a temporary loss of as much as 1.5 million bpd to the United 
States.[17] War fears also periodically trouble the market. 
The attack on the Limburg, which did not affect the market, is perhaps most analogous to an oil 
spill. Depending on the account, the Limburg lost between 50,000 and 90,000 barrels of oil. 
Although it is difficult to get annual information for all types of spills, a detailed report is available 
for 1999.[18] In that year, 760,000 barrels of oil spilled in 257 incidents (of at least 240 barrels). 
Of these 11 involved tankers with a total loss of about 157,000 barrels. Most of the spills involved 
pipelines. However the largest spills were associated with tankers. Of the 66 largest spills, 48 
involved tankers. 
The International Owner Tanker Pollution Federation Limited (IOTPFL) keeps an annual 
database of spills. Since 2000, there have been only 3-5 large spills associated with tankers a 
year.[19] The decline in spills after 1990 can be attributed in part to the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 
that required all tankers built after 1994 that come to the United States to have double hulls. In 
light of the IOTPFL data, we can see that the Limburg case, by itself, does not pose a unique 
problem and falls well within the parameters of normal "accidental" spillage. Therefore it is not 
surprising that it had no apparent effect on the oil market. 
Attacks on pipelines also cause spills. But here too they would seem to fall within the parameters 
of normal wear and tear. The Russians had 22,000 pipeline bursts in 2005 and suffer at least 10 
serious leaks a year.[20] In 2006, one pipeline had a 2000 barrel spill. 
Many of the pipelines in places like Iraq and Pakistan are vulnerable and easily attacked. They 
are also old and susceptible to leaking in any case. One commentator has even called pipeline 
sabotage the terrorist's weapon of choice.[21] Attacks on the pipeline system are seen as a major 
reason that Iraq will not reach its full potential as an exporter.[22]  
Aligning Targets, Insurgents, Terrorists, and Energy Infrastructure  
As many commentators have noted, the insurgents and oil tend to be in the same places or at 
least within easy striking distance. Moreover, some studies suggest that an over-reliance on 
primary commodities increase the likelihood of civil war. For example, series of studies conducted 
at the World Bank suggests that the primary motivation for rebel activity is the opportunity 
provided by the exploitation of primary commodities in their country.[23] Although Collier and 
Hoeffler were thinking of commodities like diamonds, timber, coffee and coca, oil plays a big role 
in the economic indicator they used to measure economic dependence on primary commodities. 
This reliance on a primary commodity in a poor country with limited prospects for growth forms a 
witches' brew for internal political violence. Although other studies have not found as strong as 
effect as Collier and Hoeffler, there are certainly several case studies that illustrate their point, 
including Sudan and Nigeria.[24] 
Indeed, it is interesting to note that many of the places listed by the U.S. Energy Information 
Agency as "energy hot spots" suffer from an excessive reliance on oil as a major source of 
national income.[25] All of these countries and regions are highly dependent on energy exports 
and suffer from local or nearby political instability. Instability in Nigeria and Iraq has substantially 
decreased global energy supplies. 
Russia poses a different problem as it uses its position for political gain. The oil and gas sector 
makes up 20 percent of the Russian economy accounts for over 60 percent of the country's 
export revenues the dramatic increase in the price of energy has been a major reason for 
Russia's increasing assertiveness in the world arena. 
Instability in Venezuela has affected the market in two ways. Hugo Chavez has threatened to cut 
off oil supplies to the United States several times, most recently after Exxon Mobil secured court 
orders in the United States, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom to freeze Venezuelan 
assets. Exxon Mobil is seeking compensation for facilities seized by Venezuela. Chavez has 
never made good on his threats in part because there are few refineries that can handle 
Venezuela's heavy sour crude.[26] Moreover, Venezuela suffers from internal instability as large 
segments of Venezuela society oppose Chavez. In 2002, a devastating strike shut down 
Venezuelan oil industry as opponents hoped to oust Chavez. At least two tankers joined the strike. 
It is often the case that once a civil war or sectarian violence starts, the local energy infrastructure 
becomes a target. This is clearly the case in Iraq and Colombia. Furthermore, in Pakistan the 
Baluchis believe the governing Punjabis are exploiting their resources so the Baluchis attack the 
pipelines that take the natural gas to Punjab.  
Flows and Ungoverned Territories  
Not only does political instability characterize many oil exporting states, many major choke points 
are situated in or nearby such areas. The U.S. Energy Information Agency has identified the 
major flows of oil and chock points, including the Russian system of pipelines and export 
terminals because it is near capacity (see Table Two). Malacca has become increasingly 
important because of growing Chinese energy demand.  
The RAND Corporation has recently done a study looking at the relationship between 
ungoverned territories and prospects for terrorism.[27] Table Three gives a list of ungoverned 
territories and their proximity to energy sources or flows. The only area distant from energy 
sources or flows is the Pakistani-Afghan border region, reputed location of Osama bin Laden and 
his lieutenants.  
The RAND study selected these areas based on two important aspects: ungovernability and 
conduciveness to terrorist or insurgent presence. Ungovernability means that the state has 
abdicated or is unable to perform its responsibilities in particular areas that ordinarily would fall 
under its control. RAND looks at four main variables to determine ungovernability: "(1) the level of 
state penetration of society; (2) the extent to which the State has a monopoly on the use of force; 
(3) the extent to which the state controls its borders; and (4) whether the state is subject to 
external intervention by other states."[28] Conduciveness is also a function of four variables: "(1) 
adequacy of infrastructure and operational access, (2) availability of sources of income, (3) 
favorable demographics, and (4) invisibility."[29] 
Table Two: World Oil Transit Chokepoints  
Choke Point  Traffic (millions bpd 2006)  Past disturbances  
Strait of Hormuz  16.5-17.0  Sea mines during Iran-Iraq War; 
terrorist threats after 9/11  
Malacca  15  Pirates including terrorist threat 
in 2003; poor visibility form 
smoke haze  
Suez Canal/Sumed pipeline  3.8  Closed for eight years after 1967 
war; Two tankers run aground 
2007  
Bab el-Mandab  3.2  USS Cole attacked 2000; 
Limburg attacked 2002  
Bosporus  3.0  Numerous shipping accidents  
Panama Canal  0.4     
Russia Pipelines/Terminals  Druzhba (1.2 million bbd); 
Baltic Pipeline  
System (840,000 bbl/d)  
   
Source: http://www.eia.doe.gov/cabs/World_Oil_Transit_Chokepoints/Background.html accessed 
March 2, 2008.  
Table Three: RAND list of ungoverned territories next to both oil producing areas and 
flows  
Ungoverned Territory  Proximity to Energy Sources or Flows  
The Pakistani-Afghan Border Region  None—source of global jihad  
The Arabian Peninsula  Saudi Arabia; Hormuz, Horn of Africa  
The Sulawesi-Mindanao Arc  Malacca  
The East Africa Corridor  Horn of Africa; Sudan; Bab el-Mandab  
West Africa  Gulf of Guinea; Nigeria  
The North Caucasus  Russian pipelines; BTC  
The Colombia-Venezuela Border  Colombia; Venezuela  
The Guatemala-Chiapas Border  Mexico  
Source: Angel Rabasa, et al., Ungoverned Territories: Understanding and Reducing Terrorism 
Risks. MG-561, 2007 
Important for our analysis is the presence of armed organized groups next to critically important 
choke points—in particular Hormuz and Bab el-Mandab. All of these areas are characterized by a 
lack of border controls—which means that, in effect, until such time as the state itself gains 
sufficient capacity, outsiders will have to ensure that these groups will not operate outside their 
areas. 
RAND also found that favorable demographics were a key factor in determining conduciveness to 
terrorism. Particularly important is the existence of supportive social norms that allow social and 
cultural resistance. RAND thinks that this is less true for the Straits of Hormuz and the Bab el-
Mandab (the Horn of Africa) but truer of Mindanao, which is some distance from the Strait of 
Malacca. In sum RAND thinks that the central government has not really tried to assert control 
over areas around near the Straits of Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandab. In contrast, the central 
government has met resistance in Mindanao. 
Despite the proximity and opportunity of energy flows and sources to rather large nests of 
terrorists, surprisingly the infrastructure is infrequently attacked. Reasons vary. First and most 
obviously, the insurgents seem to be fully preoccupied in their local attacks on governments. 
Second, the kind of attacks must often cited by pundits require a level of skill and planning and 
logistics support beyond the capacity of most global Jihadists. Given a choice between a 
relatively soft and insecure target such as a pipeline and the relatively hard and protected Saudi 
oil facilities, the Jihadists will choose the soft target. Finally, the U.S. government and others have 
been quite active in thwarting these attacks, most especially in the area of maritime security.  
Conclusions and Observations  
Fear mongering analogous to what has occurred on the WMD threat posed by transnational 
terrorists has affected the consideration of the threat posed to energy security by the same group. 
Despite the tens of thousands of terrorist incidents since 9/11 and thousands of piracy events 
there has been only one major successful attack on the global energy infrastructure, the French 
tanker Limburg in 2002. This seems remarkable given the prominence attacks on energy 
infrastructure have play in the views of certain al-Qaeda theorists. The partial answer to this 
comes from RAND—al-Qaeda, despite its rhetoric, is not seriously going after economic targets. 
Even though we have managed to establish that transnational terrorists have not made economic 
targets a serious priority, there a number of things that should be done and some in fact are being 
done already in deterring the possibility of future attacks. First, and most obviously, increasing 
spare capacity should have priority. This is not so much in reaction to the threat posed by 
transnational terrorists to energy security but because of the increasing fragility of the energy 
supply system to disruption of any kind, natural or man-made. The East African corridor, 
especially in the Horn of Africa, and the Arabian Peninsula should have priority for weight of effort 
both in the near and far term. These areas are near both energy sources and transit choke points 
-- especially Hormuz and the Bab el-Mandab. 
RAND makes several recommendations about how to proceed with these areas. The major 
problem is how "to increase the capacity of the states to extend their reach into these spaces and 
thereby reduce their availability to terrorist networks."[30] For the Arabian Peninsula, there are a 
large number of programs already underway. However, no country in this area yet participates in 
the U.S. Terrorism Interdiction Program. RAND also recommends that the local police and interior 
ministry forces in the area receive more training, especially in the area of border security. 
The U.S. government approach to the Horn of Africa has been much more direct. The United 
States has a major military presence in Djibouti with the Combined Joint Task Force—Horn of 
Africa (CJTF-HOA).[31] This JTF has an extensive ongoing civic engagement program in the 
region. Another U.S. initiative is the Global Peace Operations Initiative that was announced at the 
G8 summit in 2004. This program was intended to increase the capacity of the local militaries to 
conduct peacekeeping.[32] Moreover, the United Kingdom has a counterterrorism program 
intended to showcase Kenya as a means to develop a more comprehensive counterterrorism 
strategy.[33] 
The comments that RAND makes for the Horn of Africa also apply for the Arabian Peninsula: 
The overall aim should be to build sustained national resilience that is intolerant of, and effective 
against, terrorist and associated extremist designs. This can only occur if hard security initiatives 
are linked with a broader array of policies designed to promote political, social, and economic 
stability. Without such a two-track approach, there is little chance that counterterrorist modalities 
will take root or provide the basis for the effective mitigation of threats to peace and normalcy.[34] 
An "ungoverned territory" does not immediately abut the Strait of Malacca, especially since the 
Aceh insurgency in Indonesia. The Sulawesi-Mindanao arc is at some distance from the Strait. 
Nevertheless, pirates continue to be active in the Strait of Malacca and hijacked a gas tanker in 
2005.[35] After this episode, the littoral states increased the number and duration of their patrols 
and incidents fell off.[36] Although Singapore among littoral states is amenable to foreign 
assistance, Malaysia and Indonesia are not, in contrast to the situation on the Arabian Peninsula 
littoral. 
Malaysia's Prime Minister Abdullah rejects the U.S. proposal for an international force to patrol 
the Malacca Strait. At a recent international conference he said, "We are strongly against any 
involvement of foreign assets to ensure security of the strait."[37] 
Several combined task forces operate in and around the Arabian Peninsula littoral; all of them 
intended in part to deal with the problem of transnational terrorism. Two Combined Task Forces 
cove the Arabian (Persian) Gulf and the other the Horn of Africa. CTF-150 is a multinational task 
force that operates from Djibouti. It conducts maritime security operations in the Gulf of Aden, 
Gulf of Oman, the Arabian Sea, Red Sea and the Indian Ocean. The task force at various times 
has been commanded by a French, Dutch, German, British and Pakistan officers, whose navies 
make up the ships. According to Vice Adm. David C. Nichols Jr., Combined Maritime Forces 
Component (CFMCC) commander, "The mission, fundamentally, is to prevent terrorists from 
using the sea as a venue for terrorist attacks or an enabler for terrorist attacks ashore."[38] 
Combined Task Force 58 is in the northern Persian Gulf and protects oil terminals. Combined 
Task Force 152 patrols the middle and southern Persian Gulf. CTF 58 consists of forces from 
Australia, the United Kingdom, the United States and Iraq. British and Australian officers have led 
the task force. Only American ships are involved in CTF 152. These forces have thwarted terrorist 
attacks. On April 24, 2004, terrorist used three dhows loaded with explosives to attack the Iraqi oil 
terminal near the Iraqi port of Umm Qasr. They failed, blowing themselves up as coalition forces 
moved to intercept them.[39] 
Nothing comparable to the CTFs around the Arabian Peninsula exists in the Strait of Malacca. 
The United States does have an annual exercise with littoral states conducted under the auspices 
of Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training (CARAT).[40] 
As we have seen above, maritime security is good and getting better in part because early 
problems with tankers, having nothing to do with terrorists, have been addressed.  
The Government Accounting Office has recently released a report looking at threat to tankers.[41] 
They assessed that tankers faced three main types of threats—suicide bombings, standoff 
attacks and armed assaults. The GAO found that much was being done to meet the challenges 
internationally but some problems exist in implementation of a number of agreements. 
Pipeline security can be improved significantly just as it was with the BTC pipeline, although 
many of the measures taken would primarily be appropriate for building new pipelines. A number 
of significant security measures were taken, among them, burying the pipeline along almost its 
entire route and hardening the pipeline against corrosion. Above ground structures have 
extensive security measures, including concrete blast walls, security cameras and specially 
trained gendarmerie.[42] British Petroleum has signed a bilateral agreement with the Georgian 
government for additional security measures. 
A recent study has recommended the BTC approach for new pipelines in Iraq.[43] It concludes 
"significant improvements in export capacity are possible despite an ongoing insurgent campaign 
to hinder the flow of oil." Both infrastructure expansion and defensive measures such as burying 
pipelines and hardening above-ground facilities can significantly mitigate the effects of terrorist 
attacks. 
In summary, the threat from and effect of transnational terrorism is much less than many pundits 
have argued. In essence, the transnational terrorism poses a challenge well within the 
parameters of natural events and the ability of the current security system to handle. We see no 
reason to dispute Robert Larsson's main point; the problem is more one of short-term shortage of 
supply and spare capacity: 
Well, we must remember that the prime threat to the security of supply in the short-term 
perspective is not terrorism, or even politics. It's Mother Nature. That's the biggest problem—
shortage of supply. But most of our political attention is directed toward the threat of terrorism. 
But terrorism is only a minor problem in the short-term perspective. It's easier to cope with that 
than to cope with political unreliability or a deficit in gas.[44] 
Moreover, with respect to maritime terrorism, RAND has concluded, "Many perceptions of 
maritime terrorism risks do not align with the reality of threats and vulnerabilities."[45] The sky is 
definitely not falling.  
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